“The Internet has no territorial boundaries.
Not only is there perhaps ‘no there there’, the
‘there’ is everywhere where there is Internet access.”1

I. Introduction

In modern times legal systems of many countries face challenges in adjusting their
traditional institutions to the new reality of electronic commerce. One of the most
promising technologies in this field is a system of automated communication in which
electronic agents assist people in the trading process with no legal frameworks
established in advance. This technology is much more advanced than the Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) where prospective human trading partners enter “interchange
agreements” with each other prior to the commencement of a trading.
This paper will analyze the American and Polish approach to this matter and show
how the two systems which originate from the same source, meaning, the UNCITRAL
standards, treat the problems differently.
The first chapter presents electronic agents and their historical development. It is
followed by a discussion of the legal status of intelligent agents and their contractual
capacities. Finally, the third and fourth chapters analyze the American and Polish laws
governing electronic contracts, including contract formation, safety procedures and
avoidance doctrines. After this debate one may decide whether the current legislation is
ready for transactions concluded by electronic agents.

1

Digital Equipment Corporation v. Altavista Technology, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, (D. Mass.1997).

1

A. Historical development of electronic agents

The notion of an electronic agent was established in the United States, a country
where the artificial intelligence technology movement commenced. Famous research
centers, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Carnegie Mellon
University (CMU), Stanford University and IBM have operated with this term since the
mid-1950s. The earliest computer program operating as an electronic agent, called
LogicTheorist, was developed at CMU and imitated the “human way of thinking.”2
The original task of electronic agents as tools, was to discover and count the
number of Web servers. This was an important task since the rapidly increasing content
of the Internet made it impossible to gather and process information by manual
browsing.3
Electronic agents of the first generation, such as LogicTheorist, were only able to
perform relatively easy tasks, such as searching and providing relevant information for
their users. Later, in the 1980s they also could be programmed within the Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) system to issue a standard offer and to both record and acknowledge
acceptances from the trading partners.
The classical search engines that belong to the first generation of electronic agents
are divided into three categories. The first group is information search engines that gather
information on the web, classify it following criteria generally determined by their users
and display a list of links to related websites. The second category comprises the
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directories and portals that contain a database of links to websites that have subscribed to
an agreement with the concerned service provider. The last type is the specialized search
engines that are directed to very specific topics such as ticket selling or gathering of press
articles.4 The most common examples of search engines are: AltaVista, Google, Go,
Lycos, Excite, Northern Light, FAST and Inktomi. In all those applications search
engines do not act autonomously since the service provider controls the extent of the
activities.
In today’s world search engines that only respond to requests for information are
no longer sufficient, therefore, a second generation of electronic agents is being
developed. These sophisticated electronic agents are capable of performing more
complex actions that include tasks, such as initiating, negotiating and formatting
contracts. To meet the high expectations of their users they possess human characteristics
such as intelligence, creativity and pro-activeness. What distinguishes these intelligent
agents from other electronic agents is that they have autonomy, meaning that besides the
built-in knowledge they gain their own experience. This indicates that they can operate
without the direct intervention of human beings or other agents, and have some degree of
control over their actions and internal state.5 They are promising tools for electronic
commerce and nowadays they are mostly used to assist buyers (BargainFinder, Kasbah6,
Marketspace) and sellers (AgentWare).7 At the same time, however, the activities of
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electronic agents raise legal questions of validity of contracts concluded with their help
since there is no direct control of human users over independently acting electronic
devices.

B. Definition of an electronic agent

The widely accessible Internet has connected people from most parts of the world
and created one uniform market. So far, however, a single, universally acceptable
definition of an electronic agent has not been introduced. In literature many terms for
electronic agents are used interchangeably; agents are called assistants, digital butlers8,
intelligent software agents, intelligent bots, autonomous or mobile agents9, spiders,
crawlers or web robots.10
Electronic agents are used in so many forms and for so many purposes that it is
difficult to create one general definition. That is why Russell and Norvig, well-known
scientists in the field of artificial intelligence,

defined electronic agents broadly as

“anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting
upon that environment through effectors.”11
Although, a global definition of an electronic agent does not exist, some countries
have adopted their own definitions. For example, in the United States state and federal
legislatures adopted a definition drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which says that electronic agent means a computer
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program used independently to initiate an action or respond without review or action by
an individual.12 Poland, following the trend in the European Union, has not defined
electronic agents within its legal system.13

C. Characteristics of electronic agents

Although there is no widely accepted definition of the phrase “electronic agent”,
certain characteristics of these agents can distinguish them from other computer
programs. Scientists have enumerated these key elements as being: autonomy, social
ability, reactivity and pro-activity. Autonomy means that the agent has the capacity to act
without the intervention of its human or other user and thereby has some level of control
over its activities and internal state. Social ability indicates that the agent has the ability
to communicate with other agents and humans through a shared agent communication
language. Reactivity implies that the agent is able to perceive an environment and
respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur within it. The last characteristic, proactiveness, means that agents are able to demonstrate goal-directed activity by taking
initiative.14
Agents that possess the abovementioned characteristics are within a weak notion
of agency.15 There also is a strong notion of agency that requires an agent to have
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additional features, such as knowledge, belief, intention, obligation, mobility,16
veracity,17 benevolence18 and rationality19.20 In today’s world most electronic devices
employed by the Internet users do not possess the above-mentioned characteristics. They
are treated as mere tools because they are not capable of creating any legally binding
relationships. For example, a worldwide known search engine “Google” is an automatic
device that may be used only to search for specified terms. “Google” cannot be employed
for any other purposes because it lacks autonomy, meaning that all its work is controlled
by the human user.

D. Classification of electronic agents

There are many different classifications of electronic agents presented in the
literature and they are based on various factors, such as intelligence, mobility,
interactivity, trustworthiness, etc.
Revelli divides electronic agents into several groups. The simplest are search
information agents followed by watcher agents which track changes on the Internet as to
specific information and areas of interest of the user. The last two are agents for ecommerce such as shopping agents, like Shopper.com and assistant agents, a type of
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desktop tool that organizes computer work such as filtering, deletion and response to
received e-mails.21
Stuurman and Wijnands made a clear grouping of agents by arranging them into
passive, active and transaction agents. According to the authors, passive agents relate to
programs that function and interact within the user’s own environment. Active agents, on
the other hand, actively gather and process information. Finally, transaction agents
perform transactions for or with a consumer, an example being an agent that orders a
book for a user on the basis of a consumer’s profile.22
In this paper close attention will be paid to the performance of transaction agents
since only this category is able to conclude and perform legally binding contracts.
Currently a great number of Internet retailers work with help of transaction agents,
because their use speeds up transactions and decreases the cost of service. For instance,
companies like “Expedia.com”or “Priceline.com” conclude contracts for sale of airplane
tickets through electronic agents. Therefore, a customer who needs to purchase a plane
ticket from Pittsburgh to Bologna must invite an electronic agent to make an offer by
specifying the date and place of departure, as well as the place of destination. In response,
the electronic agent usually makes several offers from which the customer may choose
the one he favors. If the customer accepts the offer he likes a contract is concluded and
almost simultaneously the confirmation of the agreement is sent to the customer’s
mailbox. On the other hand, there are also situations in which it is the individual who
makes an offer and an electronic agent’s response operates as the acceptance. For
example, “Priceline.com” has an option in which it is the customer who specifies the date
21

S. Gonzalo, A Business Outlook regarding Electronic Agents, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Vol.9 No. 3, 189-203 (2001).
22
STUURMAN & WIJNANDS, quoted by Cross, supra note 9, at 176.

7

and place of departure, destination and price of ticket he wishes to purchase. After
sending his offer he waits for an electronic agent’s response. If the electronic agent
accepts the customer’s offer a contract is formed, if the offer is rejected the customer may
make another offer or ask for an offer from the electronic agent. There are also situations
in which both parties are electronic agents acting on behalf of their users. In those cases
electronic agents on a customers’ side may use the built-in knowledge of their users’
preferences and apply it during the negotiation process. One can imagine, a scenario in
which an electronic agent “working” for a businessman buys a plane ticket for a specified
seat, books a room in his favorite hotel and rents his ideal car. All those transactions seem
to be simple, but in reality they may raise legal issues of contract formation, enforcement
and liability for an electronic agent’s actions. The consequences of an intelligent agent’s
behavior will also depend on its legal status and thus, three different legal solutions will
be presented in order to decide which best fits the needs of the market and legal
principles.

II. Electronic agents in the eyes of law

It is beyond question that electronic agents are revolutionary and a promising tool
for electronic commerce. However, many legal issues in regard to their contractual
abilities are still pending since electronic agents of the second generation have appeared
in electronic commerce just a few years ago. The technology of electronic agents also
brings new considerations in the area Internet security, trust, privacy and consumer
protection.

8

A. Electronic agent as a mere communication tool

In order to resolve the issue of enforceability of contracts concluded by electronic
agents some authors proposed considering intelligent agents as mere communication
tools such as telephones or fax machines. In this approach anything emanating from the
electronic agent is in fact to be construed as emanating from the legally capable party
using the agent.23 The rationale for this theory is that people often sign contracts without
reading them and those contracts are as binding as those which are thoroughly analyzed.
To support this theory Tom Allen suggested that lawmakers can adopt a presumption that
a person who employs electronic agent and relies on it expresses his or her intent to be
bound by the computer device’s actions.24
Although the attribution rule solves the problem of enforceability this theory is
not free from criticism. The biggest disadvantage of it is that it places a harsh burden on
the user who has a limited control over the computer, which can initiate actions on its
own.25 The user is responsible for the conduct of the electronic agent regardless of his
knowledge as to the concluded contracts and their terms.26 On the other hand, one may
say that this view gives a strong incentive to the user to ensure that the agent is properly
operating and being adequately policed.
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B. Electronic agent as an agent under the law of agency

A great deal of literature has also been dedicated to the governance of electronic
agents by the law of agency. This topic has been discussed at length in the United States
as well as in Europe since agency law has a potential to regulate the legal issues in
automated transactions.
In the United States the most ardent supporter of the application of agency law to
electronic agents is Fischer, who argues that the comparison seems obvious:

when computers are given the capacity to communicate with each
other based upon preprogrammed instructions, and when they
possess the physical capacity to execute agreements […] without
any human awareness […] beyond the original programming of
the computer’s instructions, these computers serve the same
function as similarly instructed human agents of a party and thus
should be treated under the law identically to those human
agents.27

Fisher further argues that this approach is reasonable since the principles of
agency law do not require an agent to have a contractual capacity28 in order to be
competent to act as an agent.29 In order to avoid the requirement of acceptance of the
agency mandate he proposes the adoption of legal fiction of consent.30 The author also
emphasizes that the idea can be easily adopted in the United States since its law does not
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require any special formalities for the creation of the agency relationship.31 According to
the Restatement 2d of Agency Law § 26 in order to establish an agency relationship the
parties may have express, written or verbal agreement that determines the authority,
duties and liability of the agent.32
There are, however, other legal issues that application of the law of agency cannot
solve. The biggest concern is that agency law only applies to legal persons and only legal
persons can make contracts. In order to overcome this obstacle, another commentator,
Kerr, suggests that electronic devices are included within the set of rules that form the
external law of agency since the disputes will only involve the principal and the third
party engaged in the agent transaction.33 Kerr’s view, however, was challenged by an
argument that the third party frequently has the right to choose to take action against the
principal or agent. For example, this issue is raised by the doctrine of undisclosed
principal. It says that whenever the agent acts in his own name without disclosing to the
third party that he is acting as an agent, he is liable to the third contacting party, and the
later disclosure of the existence and identity of the principal does not exclude the liability
of the agent. In that scenario the agent is jointly and severally liable with the principal for
the resulting damages.34
Kerr’s approach definitely has a flaw. It excludes issues from the internal agency
relationship, meaning the one between the principal and the agent. As a result the
principal would not have recourse against the agent in situations where the agent exceeds
31
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its authority or when it engages another incompetent agent. This means that the principal
has the rights and duties in respect to third parties associated with an electronic agent
transaction, but no parallel rights in respect to internal relations.35
The theory of application of agency law to electronic agents has been criticized
for its complicated structure. It fails to explain issues at many levels and calls for too
many exceptions to the rules of agency.36 According to scholars this theory fails because
the law proposes simpler ways to reach the same result.37

C. Electronic agent as a legal person- ePerson

In the search for the best solutions scholars have also considered granting
electronic agents legal personality. The justification for that proposal stems from a theory
introduced by Lawrence Solum and is based on several factors. The first argument is that
any entity, which has some characteristics in common with natural persons, such as selfconsciousness, is morally entitled to legal protection.38 This view, however, was
criticized for its focus on a computer as an entity instead of on the protection of those
who trade through the computer. The second reason for recognizing ePersons is that a
sophisticated computer program may have social ability, meaning that people who
interact electronically think that electronic agents are the source of communication, rather
than their human users. It is therefore people’s perception of computer programs that
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determines whether they are something more then just mere instruments.39 The last
argument for this solution is the legal and commercial convenience that comes from
recognizing electronic agents as independent entities. The advocates of conferring legal
personality to an electronic agent argue that this approach would solve the problem of
electronic agents’ capacity to express consent and bear liability because the legal fiction
would not be necessary at that point.40
An initial and direct effect of attributing legal personality to electronic agents is to
grant them legal rights and obligations. In consequence electronic agents, as any other
legal person, would be able to have assets, to sue and be sued. They basically would have
all economic rights, except personal rights, which are reserved only for natural persons.
It is argued in legal literature that it is still difficult to justify attributing legal
personality to electronic agents on the basis of these arguments. The biggest concern is
the difficulty of identifying the agent since it may not be clear whether it is the hardware
or software.41 In the world of companies and corporations as legal entities, a system of
registers solves this problem by identifying all legal persons, their names and addresses,
thus giving companies’ standings for commercial purposes.
As for electronic agents, Karnow proposed a system called the “Turing Registry”.
The general idea is that the registry would issue certificates for anybody who plans to use
39
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an electronic agent and would guarantee coverage for risks arising from its use. The
measurement of premium would depend on the level of intelligence of an electronic
agent. In other words, the more intelligent and autonomous the agent is, the greater the
risk, and the higher the premium to be paid. According to its author, the “Turning
Registry” would be mandatory for programmers and all those who plan to use
autonomous electronic devices.42 However, many scholars think that this system does not
solve completely the problem with identification and moreover, leads to extreme cost
which is hard to justify at the current level of electronic agents’ development.43
It is obvious that the concept of an electronic person offers a crucial advantage
over the other approaches since it allows for limiting the liability for the owner of the
agent. In other words, the user would not be personally liable for an electronic agent’s
actions, but just up to the amount of a premium paid. All the financial responsibility of an
electronic agent would be covered from the assets of the electronic agent itself acting as a
legal person. The contracting party also draws some advantage from that. The party can
check the soundness of the agent in the register and thus adjust his decision to conclude
the contract.

III. Regulation of electronic agents in the United States

The issue of electronic agents and their ability to make electronic contracts has
been recognized by American lawmaking bodies since the late 1990s. The legislative
movement in the United States has been influenced by the work of the United Nations
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Commission on International Trade Law.44 The developing technologies of automated
computer systems and subsequent legislation and its interpretation on the international
level made American scholars45 revisit traditional common law theories of contract
formation to allow contracts to be concluded without human intervention.46
So far, in the United States there are four primary acts that recognize and govern
actions of intelligent agents. The first national effort at providing some uniform rules on
electronic commerce was the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act promulgated in
1999.47 UETA turned out to be a successful compilation of procedural law facilitating
electronic contracts.48 Another work of the NCCUSL, the Uniform Computer Information
Act, did not get such wide support. Since 1999 it has been approved only in two states,
Maryland and Virginia, because it includes too many controversial solutions.

For

example, the UCITA has adopted a layered contract approach, which was denied in some
jurisdictions.49 Due to its narrow legislative approval the UCITA will not be analyzed in
a great detail even though it provides comprehensive substantive law on electronic
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commerce. Closer attention will be paid to the revised version of the UCC Article 2
which also regulates electronic agents and their contractual capacities.50 On the federal
level electronic commerce is governed by the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act51 which is designed to ensure that an electronic contract is not
“denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or
electronic record was used in its formation.”52
Before these acts are analyzed it must be explained that E-Sign, UCITA, UETA,
and the revised UCC are consistent statutes which merely differ in their approach to
contract formation and validity. Their application will depend on the form and the subject
of contract, as well as on the issue raised in the dispute. Consequently, UCC Article 2
will govern sales of goods, meaning all things that are movable at the time of
identification to a contract of sale.53 UETA, on the other hand, will apply to the
procedural matters of electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a
transaction.54 UCITA, where enacted, covers contracts in “computer information”
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meaning agreements to create, modify, transfer, or license computer information.55 It will
also govern hybrid contracts, if obtaining the computer information is the primary
purpose of the deal.56

A. Definition of an electronic agent

UETA was the first act in the United States that defined an electronic agent and
regulated its contractual capabilities in the world of the Internet. All the above mentioned
acts followed the UETA approach and state that: “electronic agent means a computer
program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an
action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without
review or action by an individual.”57

B. Electronic contracts

The formation of an electronic agreement is a complex process and it engages several
stages. First, an electronic agent has to search for the parties, then negotiate the terms,
draft the agreement, and finally execute it. The involvement of an intelligent agent in this
55
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process raises many legal questions that affect the validity of a contract. This paper will
analyze the American approach to the key issues in this matter, such as an electronic
manifestation of intent, attribution of electronic agent’s actions and avoidance doctrines.
Finally some cases touching the problem of attribution will be presented.

1. Objective theory of assent

The general rule of American contract law says that a contract is concluded if there is
mutual assent, an intention from both parties to be legally bound, and consideration.58 In
determining whether there is “meeting of minds” the American doctrine adopted an
objective theory of assent and the standard of a reasonable person. It means that a party’s
mental assent is not necessary to make a contract; the real but unexpressed state of mind
is irrelevant. It is, hence, enough that the other party had reason to believe that the first
party had the intention to agree.59 This objective theory allows electronic agents to be
used in a contract conclusion process and to infer contractual intent from the
programming and use of electronic devices.60
Interestingly, the UCITA, unlike any other statue, defines the contractual notion of a
"manifestation of assent" in the context of electronic commerce. Section 112(b) stipulates
that an electronic agent manifests assent on behalf of the person using it if, "after having
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an opportunity to review”61 a record or term, the electronic agent authenticates it or
"engages in operations that indicate acceptance."62 The consequence of this provision is
significant because it clarifies that an electronic agent is capable of manifesting its user’s
assent and, thus, has the power to conclude contracts.63 In result, if a party shows that a
robot has engaged in specific conduct to access information and obtained or used this
information, the party will prove that there was assent and consequently a binding
contract.64
The current and revised UCC does not include a provision on manifestation of assent,
but the amended version prevents a party from claiming a lack of contractual intent when
electronic agents have interacted to form a contract without human intervention.65 Section
2-212 specifically validates any action performed by an electronic agent by attributing
such action to the parties.66 Under the current version contracts concluded through
electronic agents may also be valid and attributed to an electronic agent user since in
matters not governed by the UCC the UETA will step in and validate an electronic
contract.67 The theory behind this approach is that an electronic record or signature is not
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ascribed to a machine, but to the person operating or programming the machine just like
the person would do it in a paper medium.68

2. Battle of the forms in automated transactions

Revised UCC, UCITA and UETA recognize contracts formed by the interaction of
electronic agents acting without human intervention.69 They also recognize contracts
formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual acting on his own
behalf or the behalf of another person.70 It is easy to imagine that at the negotiation stage
parties will exchange their terms and a “battle of forms” is likely to occur. In this
situation the revised UCC provides a “knock-out rule” which results in incorporating only
those terms on which both parties agreed.71 The UCC, however, makes an exception to
the general rule and, under some conditions, protects a user of an electronic agent when it
interacts with an individual. Section 2-204(4)(b) states that an individual interacting with
an electronic agent will be deemed to accept an offer of the agent if the individual takes
an action that he can refuse to take and that he has reason to know (1) will indicate
acceptance to the electronic agent, and (2) cause the agent to perform or provide benefits
that are the subject of the contract. The contract, so formed, will not include any terms or

UETA § 14. Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common Law "Mailbox
Rule", 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (2004).
A problem with attribution may arise in legislations that have not adopted the UETA (New York and
Illinois). However, Register.com v. Verio, decided according to the New York law and discussed in detail
later, shows that it may not be the issue and that general rules are sufficient.
68
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expressions made by the individual (i.e. counter-offer) if the individual has reason to
know the electronic agent cannot react to such terms.72

C. Avoidance doctrines

In a world of electronic transactions some changes or errors may be introduced into
an electronic record, either because of system or transmission problems, or intentional
human alteration. As a consequence difficult questions of liability of service providers
and the rights and obligations of the parties arise and can result in costly litigation. The
Drafting Committee of the UETA noticed this problem and was concerned about the ease
with which errors by individuals could be made, for example by hitting the "enter" key
twice or mistyping a letter or number. Another concern was that, in transactions with
automated agents, individuals would have less ability to correct errors than in
transactions with other individuals since electronic communication is almost
instantaneous.73
These concerns have been so pervasive that the UETA has two basic principles in
Section 10 applicable to the errors in automated transactions.74 The first permits parties to
agree on a “security procedure” that detects changes or errors in electronic records and
notifies the parties accordingly. For example, parties may agree to employ extra software
that supervises whether the terms are somehow non-matching and automatically sends an
e-mail to the negotiating parties in order to put them on notice of any errors or changes. A
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“security procedure” may also apply automatically, an example being a procedure of
contract formation adopted by “Priceline.com.” When a person wants to buy a round-trip
plane ticket to Bologna and chooses a date of departure for April 17, 2005 and date of
returning for April 15, 2005, Priceline will notify the customer that the date of returning
is scheduled two day earlier than departure. If parties adopt such a procedure a
nonconforming party loses the right to avoid the effect of the changed or erroneous
electronic record.75 Therefore, if the customer ignores the warning and purses the
purchase he is not entitled to get away from this deal. It should be noted however, that an
individual that does not qualify for this special provision is not automatically bound by an
erroneous order because he may invoke other laws, such as the law of mistake, to try and
undo the order.
In instances where an error prevention or error correction procedure has not been
agreed to, the UETA § 10(2) entitles a party to avoid a transaction that involves an error.
This right arises when an electronic agent has not allowed for the prevention or correction
of an error, but is subject to several conditions. First, on learning that the other party
believed a transaction had occurred, the individual must give prompt notice of the error
and that he or she did not intend to be bound. In addition, the individual may not have
used or received the benefit of the transaction. Finally, the individual must take
reasonable steps to return any consideration received as a result of the transaction,
including compliance with any reasonable instructions given by the other party for return
or destruction of the item.76 Analyzing the scenario of buying a plane ticket to Bologna
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the customer would be entitled to avoid contract if a “security procedure” was not
available and he noticed the wrong dates but did not have an opportunity to correct the
error before a contract was formed. Additionally, in order to avoid the deal he would
have to follow all the above-mentioned instructions and return any consideration
received.
The goal of these provisions is to encourage Internet retailers and others designing
web commerce systems to provide purchasers with the opportunity to review and confirm
their order before the order is placed, and in this way to avoid the high cost of possible
litigation.77 Such procedures are easily provided, for example, through the use of
"confirmation screens" where the individual is asked to confirm the terms of the
transaction. For instance, Priceline’s electronic agent demands customers to confirm the
terms of contract before it moves to the final step of charging the customer’s credit card.
By providing an opportunity for an individual to verify and confirm the information
initially sent, the other party can eliminate the possibility of the individual defending on
the grounds of inadvertent error since the electronic agent, through confirmation, allowed
for correction of the error.78
The UCITA also contains similar rules of avoidance79, but in addition clarifies that a
court may grant appropriate relief if the operations resulted from fraud, electronic
mistake, or the like.80 Another difference is that it distinguishes merchants and consumers
awarding those security procedures to consumers only.
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In electronic transactions claims of lack of capacity, undue influence and duress
probably will not arise because, first of all, electronic agents, so far, do not have
contractual capacity and, secondly, it is hard to imagine a situation in which a contracting
party is physically compelled or threatened.81 Official comments discuss defenses of
fraud and mistake as possible claims, but at the same time caution courts not to approach
such defenses with the same legal standards applicable to non-electronic transactions.82
A fraud claim is naturally hard to prove in the electronic world since it requires
demonstration that an intentional or material misrepresentation induced a party to assent
to a contract. A misrepresented party may encounter practical obstacles in showing intent
to defraud if there is no evidence that at the time of contracting the other party
misrepresented the truth or concealed material fact in order to induce another to act to his
or her detriment. Another obstacle is the scholars’ reluctance the rule that the actions,
intent and knowledge of an electronic agent are attributed to a computer user. In their
opinion this strict attribution rule is unjust and may impair development of electronic
agents.83 Therefore, the doctrine of fraud seems not to be a good claim unless a party
proves that the deceptive conduct occurred at the programming stage.84
The doctrine of mistake also brings many questions that will need to be answered by
courts. For example, it is uncertain whether an electronic agent can have “beliefs” and
under what circumstances a party that employs an electronic agent will bear the risk of
mistake. Scholars also assume that mistake will not be a good basis for relief since a
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party holds a heavy burden of proof85 and an attribution rule works against an electronic
agent’s user. Some authors suggest that in order to make this claim available for parties
employing electronic agents the rules have to be modified since traditional contract law is
unsympathetic to claims of mistake.86
Finally, a party may invoke the doctrine of unconscionability in order to
invalidate the whole contract or particular terms, but this will also bring evidentiary
difficulties. Furthermore, the Official Comments to the UCITA say that the
unconscionability doctrine will apply only to a procedural breakdown in the automated
contracting process and it is not clear why breakdowns in the process would lead to
"unconscionable" transactions.87

D. Case law on electronic agents

The case law on electronic agents is scarce since electronic commerce is a new
area of law and unfortunately many cases that potentially would solve important issues
are settled. The litigation focuses on tort claims rather than contractual matters involving
electronic agents and has not much value for the purposes of this analysis. From the
contract law point of view, so far, the courts have heard only a few cases involving
electronic agents and have focused on the issue of attribution. In order to show that
similar situations may be treated differently on an international level, besides the
American cases one German court decision will be presented.
85
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The first American case involving an automated system of communication was
Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems, Inc. v. Lederle Laboratories88 where the court
decided that the response of the seller’s computer and issuance of a tracking number for a
purchase order did not amount to an acceptance of the buyer’s offer. The court reasoned
that the telephone computer ordering system performed automated and ministerial acts
that could not constitute an acceptance.89 A commentary argued that the result could have
been different if the seller employed a more sophisticated system that verified the identity
of the orderer, checked the inventory level, allocated a portion of the inventory to
fulfilling the order, and then issued the order tracking number. It still would be an
automated system, but it might be in both parties' interests to consider it a legal
acceptance.90
On the other hand, a German court deliberating on a similar case on attribution
decided differently. The case involved a sale of goods erroneously offered by an
automated system over the Internet for a price below the price intended by the seller. The
electronic agent generated automatic replies from the seller saying that the customer’s
“order” would be immediately “carried out”. The court stated that automated
communications were attributable to the person on whose behalf the system has been
programmed and in whose names the messages were sent. The critical point in the
opinion that distinguishes this case from the Corinthian Pharmaceutical is that the court
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recognized the messages sent by the automatic reply system as binding expressions of
intention and a valid acceptance for the purposes of contract formation.91
Another case that touches the issue of the attribution rule is Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc.92 Register involved an action for breach of contract, trespass to chattels93 and
injunction filed by a registrar of Internet domain names attempting to bar defendant, a
competitor and provider of Internet services, from using an electronic agent to access and
collect contact information contained in the plaintiff’s database and from using that
database for mass marketing purposes.94 Plaintiff argued that the defendant violated the
terms of their agreement, which allowed public access to the plaintiff’s consumers’
contact information, but not for any mass-market purpose. Register.com further argued
that the use of automated software to access and collect information from the database
violated the terms of contract and harmed the plaintiff’s computer system. Verio raised in
defense that even if Register.com’s terms of use were enforceable, Verio had not
manifested any assent to those terms because it had never been asked to click on an
“accept” icon and never received legally enforceable notice of the conditions Register
intended to impose95. The court in response to this stated:
Verio’s argument might well be persuasive if its queries addressed to
Register’s computers had been sporadic and infrequent. If Verio had
submitted only one query, or even if it had submitted only a few sporadic
queries, that would give considerable force to its contention that it
91
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obtained the WHOIS96 data without being conscious that Register
intended to impose conditions, and without being deemed to have
accepted Register’s conditions. But Verio was daily submitting numerous
queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice of the terms Register
exacted97.
The court basically stated that Verio could not simply “ignore” the terms on the basis that
it did not see them since Verio’s search engine was employed to collect information from
the database98. The court rejected defendant’s contention that it did not form a contract
with Register when its search robot collected information from the database. The court
decided that Verio objectively demonstrated its assent to be bound by the Register’s
terms through its conduct, meaning subsequent inquires while aware of the proposed
terms. The court, therefore, attributed the search robot’s actions to Verio and held it liable
for breach of contract.

IV. Electronic agents under Polish law

Electronic commerce in Poland, and generally in the European Union, has not
reached as high a level as in the United States. European legislatures, however,
recognized the increasing role of the Internet, as well as new means of communication,
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and made certain changes in traditional contracting law to bridge the gap between
contracts and technology.
The Polish law of electronic commerce underwent major transformation when the
Civil Code was amended and the European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce99
took effect.100 The rules on electronic contracting were also influenced by the EU
Directive on distance selling,101 the UNCITRAL Model Law,102 the Principles of
European Contract Law103 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts.104

A. The Electronic commerce Directive

The E-commerce Directive has, so far, been the most extensive legal act on electronic
contracting even though, just like the E-Sign and UETA, it is largely procedural and does
not establish any substantive rules of European law.105
Article 9(1) of the E-commerce Directive clarifies, however, that
the Member States shall ensure that their legal system allows contracts to
be concluded by electronic means [and] that the legal requirements
applicable to the contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of
electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being deprived of legal
effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by
electronic means.106
99
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The explanatory notes of the proposal of the E-commerce Directive mention the use
of electronic agents and say that “the Member States will have to:[…] not prevent the use
of certain electronic systems as intelligent electronic agents.” However, the “electronic
agent” regulation appeared in neither the recitals nor in the Articles of the Directive and
the legislative history does not explain why drafters avoided this provision. 107
Scholars have been debating whether a contract concluded by an electronic agent
would fall within the scope of the above-cited Article 9(1) and Article 11 which governs
electronic contract formation. A strict interpretation of Article 11 may be that it does not
allow an automatic electronic response since the language used in the provisions refers to
“a recipient” and “his consent”, both of which suggest a human rather than an electronic
agent.108
On the other hand, it could also be argued that there is no express exclusion in the
Directive which precludes “a recipient” from being an electronic agent and the denial of
contracts concluded by autonomous systems is in direct conflict with the central ethos109
of this act.110 This approach has been accepted by the majority, including Polish scholars,
because it promotes the development of electronic commerce and complies with
international standards.111
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B. Contracts concluded by electronic agents

It is obvious that legal recognition of electronic agents brings great opportunities for
Polish businesses since such recognition may facilitate services and decrease the cost of
transactions. There is, however, one more aspect of electronic agents that has great
impact on the Polish legal system; they may influence the evolution of or even cause a
revolution in the legal doctrines on manifestation of assent.

1. Subjective theory of assent

Until now Polish doctrine has supported a subjective theory of assent which
distinguishes an act of will from its manifestation. Awareness of a person manifesting
intent determines interpretation of his will and an understanding of a reasonable
addressee of that statement is irrelevant.112 Under the subjective theory it is not certain
whether communication made through electronic agents is an expression of will at all
since the act of a person’s will is separated from its manifestation.113 It seems that the
subjective theory is unacceptable because it requires awareness of the author of a
communication, which is impossible in pre-programmed systems.114 A number of Polish
scholars have been calling for objectification of interpretation of will since the 1970s,
because it allows progress in commerce and promotes development of modern
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technologies. Thanks to modern trends in legal doctrine it looks that they may finally
succeed in their struggle115.
Poland is not the only country that encountered similar problems. In Germany
judges debated on the same issue and finally an expression of will made automatically
was accepted as an expression in blanco which is based on an objective theory of reliance
(Rechtscheinhaftung). According to the theory of the in blanco manifestation, one person
signs a blank form leaving the blanks for another person to fill out and all further
communications are attributed to the person who originally signed the form.116 The
German argument has been adopted, with some exceptions, by Polish doctrine, because it
solves a problem of manifestation of will and attribution of a message to a person who
uses an electronic agent.117

2. Amendments to the Civil Code

Polish law does not define or mention electronic agents, but their recognition as
mere communication tools118 is justified in the Civil Code and the Electronic Signature
Act. It is commonly agreed that the amended Article 60 of the Civil Code gives legal
effect to contracts concluded by electronic agents. The new version of Article 60 says
that the will of a person may be expressed by any behavior sufficient to show intent,

115

The leading Polish scholars, Gwiazdomorski and Radwa ski are great supporters of objectification of
theory of assent. They suggest that interpreting a will one shall consider all circumstances, customs and
good will of both parties instead of just internal will and knowledge. WOJCIECH KOCOT, O WIADCZENIA
WOLI SKŁADANE INDYWIDUALNYM ADRESATOM NA NO NIKACH ELEKTRONICZNYCH, [ELECTRONIC
EXPRESSION OF WILL MADE TO INDIVIDUAL ADDRESSEES] 52 (2005).
116
KOCOT, supra note 115, at 71.
117
STOSIO, supra note 113.
118
Theorists, however, do not exclude the possibility that messages of electronic agents will be attributed to
themselves instead of to their users. Id. at 89.

32

including an expression of will by electronic means.119 However, this amendment has
been widely criticized as totally unnecessary.120 According to the majority of scholars the
old version of the Civil Code provision was broad enough to include an electronic
expression of will. In their opinion it does not matter whether contracting parties use the
Internet in a traditional way, such as a telephone, telex or telefax where a person directly
expresses his will, or in an automated way through an electronic agent since it is assumed
that the message generated and sent by a computer comes from a person that uses the
computer.121
Some authors, on the other hand, point out that the ratio legis of Article 8 of the
Electronic Signature Act and the amendment of Article 60 is a positive assurance that an
electronic expression of will results in legal consequences and eliminates possible claims
that a contract concluded electronically is invalid.122
Another amendment that changed traditional contracting rules was an adaptation
of Article 61 § 2 which states: “Expression of will made in an electronic form is effective
towards the other person at the moment it has been posted on the service provider and its
text is available to that person.” This provision is significant because it modified a deeply
rooted receipt rule characteristic in many European legal systems.123 It derogates from the
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general rule that an expression of will takes legal effect when it reaches an addressee in a
way he can know its content.124 The requirement of receipt in electronic contracting is
now met when a message is available on the server so the addressee can read it even
though it has yet not been opened or processed. Consequently, a contract is concluded at
the time the expression of will is made available for the other party.125 This rule was
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Poland, the Civil Division in December 2003.126 The
case before the court involved an order for a money transfer that was made electronically
on the last day of the payment period. The plaintiff claimed that even though an
electronic order was made on time the defendant was late with the payment because the
money was transferred one day after the due date. The court disagreed with the plaintiff
and concluded that the electronic transfer of money became effective not when a bank
actually processed the transaction, but when the electronic order for the money transfer
was received and the bank had the necessary information available to finish the
transaction.127
Scholars consider this amendment a good step in the facilitation of electronic
commerce. At the same time they criticize the legislators for not adopting special rules on
electronic revocation of will since these traditional rules do not comply with the fast
communication provided by the Internet and therefore can make a revocation simply
impossible.128
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Another important provision on electronic contract formation is Article 66¹ § 1
which says that an offer made in an electronic form is binding upon the offeror if an
offeree immediately confirms its receipt.129 The confirmation requirement is an additional
element conditioning valid contract formation and is based on Article 11.1 of the Ecommerce Directive.130 This requirement protects consumers who may assume that they
are not bound by their offer until the other party confirmed that it received it.131 The rule
also protects offerees who get an assurance that the offer is binding upon the offeror. If
an offeree wants to conclude a contract he must immediately confirm receipt of the offer,
which does not amount to an acceptance. After having met this requirement the offeree
may accept or reject the offer. This confirmation may be made in any manner (by any
behavior) sufficient to show intent to confirm, but traditional mail may not be effective
since it may not meet the requirement of “immediate response”. In practice both
confirmation and acceptance can be done at the same time so the communication is not
delayed. Therefore, under the Polish law a customer wishing to purchase a plane ticket to
Bologna would have to immediately respond to Priceline’s offer in order to preserve his
right to accept that offer. On the other hand, if the customer were the offeror he would be
bound by his offer only if Priceline’s electronic agent confirmed that it received the
offer. It is clear that this way of contracting may delay some transactions, especially those
which are made through the exchange of electronic mail since an offeree can often read
his mail hours and even days after the message arrives at his mailbox.
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Polish legislators, in response to criticism that a confirmation requirement
endangered fast and effective trade, adopted lex specialis that eliminated the requirement
in respect to B2B transactions where professionals are in a long-lasting business
relationship132.

3. Other formal requirements in a contract formation process

Under Polish law the majority of agreements can be concluded on the Internet, but
there are many formal requirements that at this stage of technology render electronically
concluded contracts invalid. For example, if a written form is required a contract has
legal effect only if an advanced digital signature has been used and it is still not certain
whether an electronic agent can be assigned one. There is also a group of contracts133 that
do not become valid if they are not registered with a public authority or a notary.134
Moreover, the Polish legislature adopted information requirements laid down both
in the EU Directive 97/7 on distance selling and 2000 E-commerce Directive which are
hard to meet.135 According to the rules merchants are obliged to explain electronic
contract formation process, in particular, they have to provide the technical means for
identifying and correcting errors, the languages for concluding a contract, general terms
and conditions. Merchants must also inform a customer of the legal effects of the
confirmation that an offer has been received.136 Furthermore, this information must be
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submitted in an unambiguous way and the consequence of failing to meet these standards
would be a consumer’s right to rescind the contract (e.g. on the basis of mistake) or to
claim damages (e.g. on the basis of breach of pre-contractual duties).137 These
requirements clearly may delay a wide usage of electronic agents because most websites
nowadays do not even meet these information requirements and the creators of websites
do not wish to invest in technology for providing information understandable by
agents.138
As to the battle of forms, Polish law applies the mirror image rule which means
that a contract is not concluded if the terms of an offer differ from those of the
acceptance. In cases where parties use prewritten forms they must be available for the
other party before the conclusion of a contract, because a failure to comply with this
requirement results in an invalid agreement.139

C. Avoidance doctrines

In automated transactions, just as in the U.S., traditional doctrines that can be a
basis for avoidance are limited since claims such as duress, coerce, lack of awareness or
lack of free will cannot be applied to electronic agents. Therefore, only mistake, fraud
and modification of a message by a messenger140 can be taken into account and applied
per analogiam.
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In order to invoke a mistake a party must prove three conditions: that the mistake
was material so a reasonable person knowing the terms of a contract would not become a
party, that it referred to the terms of a contract and finally that it was caused by the other
contracting party.141 Unfortunately, in practice these requirements are hard to meet and in
most transactions modification of offers will be attributed to technical defects in
communication rather than to persons using electronic agents.142 In literature, however, it
is often said that in automated transactions the risk of unintended manifestations of will
should be higher than in regular contracting and a person using an electronic agent should
bear the risk.143 Scholars argue that rules on mistake must be modified, because their
current wording does not allow them to be applied to automated transactions. In this
situation the legislature may be justified in imposing a three-step procedure for contract
formation since it gives the parties an opportunity to verify the terms of an agreement and
prevent possible errors. According to Kocot, a famous scholar, the best solution would be
to liberalize the rule by replacing a condition that the other party caused the mistake with
a requirement that the other party had reason to know of or notice an error.144

V. Conclusion

Summing up, both the American and Polish legal systems find contracts
concluded by electronic agents legally binding. These countries, however, have slightly
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different approaches to this matter. American law ensures that there are no legal barriers
to electronic contracts and promotes the use of intelligent agents by adopting liberal rules
on contract formation. What is significant is that it provides procedures that allow parties
to avoid the effects of erroneously concluded contracts, whereas the Polish legislature
adopted a three-step contract formation process so errors do not occur at all. Polish law
seems a little stiff in comparison to American regulations. In Poland, in theory, there are
no legal obstacles to the use of electronic agents, but in practice their application is
considerably limited by the European Union’s regulations on consumer protection. The
reality is that the technology of intelligent agents is too expensive for individuals while
the companies that can afford it must conform to high procedural standards applicable to
professionals. This of course increases the cost of electronic commerce and consequently
discourages companies from investing in advanced technologies.
In the future, with further progress in artificial intelligence, electronic agents will,
one hopes, be used on a larger scale. The most promising solution for development is to
replace the status of electronic agents as mere communication tools with that of legal
persons. The approach of electronic agents as ePersons would be beneficial for their
users since right now the biggest concerns are the burdensome consequences of the
attribution rule. The proposed treatment of intelligent agents as agents under agency law
did not get a wide approval, but is still considered by many scholars as an option. At this
point it is too early to say when electronic agents may be granted an independent legal
status since this depends on the development of artificial intelligence as well as the
attitude of legislators and courts toward this issue.
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